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WORKERS' COMPENSATION: WAGE EFFECTS, BENEFIT 
INADEQUACIES, AND THE VALUE OF HEALTH LOSSES 
W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore* 
Abstract-Using the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey in 
conjunction with BLS risk series and state workers' compensa- 
tion benefit formulas, the authors assess the labor market 
implications of workers' compensation. Higher levels of 
workers' compensation benefits reduce wage levels, and con- 
trolling for workers' compensation raises estimates of com- 
pensating differentials for risk. The rate of trade-off between 
wages and workers' compensation suggests that benefit levels 
provide suboptimal levels of income insurance, abstracting 
from moral hazard considerations. The value of nonmonetary 
losses from job injuries (including pain and suffering and 
nonwork disability) is estimated to be $17,00-$26,00. 
I. Introduction 
A LTHOUGH there has been a decade of 
tX literature on empirical estimates of com- 
pensating differentials for job hazards,' it is only 
recently that analysts have begun to focus on the 
role of the workers' compensation system in affect- 
ing these differentials.2 From a conceptual stand- 
point one would expect workers' compensation to 
play a significant role since the employer can 
compensate workers for job risks either through 
ex ante compensation (compensating wage dif- 
ferentials) or ex post compensation (such as 
workers' compensation benefits). The relative im- 
portance of the two forms of compensation de- 
pends on the degree to which workers wish to 
insure the income risks of job injury-a value that 
hinges on factors such as the degree of wage loss 
and the effect of the accident on the marginal 
utility of consumption. 
One could omit workers' compensation from 
wage equations if there were uniformity in the 
benefit levels. There are, however, substantial vari- 
ations both by state and according to the worker's 
wage level. For example, the usual formula for 
temporary and permanent total disabilities pro- 
vides for two-thirds wage replacement with a ben- 
efit cap, so that lower paid workers effectively 
receive more benefits. The principal state dif- 
ferences are with respect to features such as ben- 
efit caps, benefit floors, and time limits for benefit 
payment. 
In view of this variation, one would expect the 
level of workers' compensation to play an im- 
portant role in analyses of the compensation 
package. Although research results to date are 
somewhat mixed, they suggest evidence of two 
types of influences. First, workers are willing to 
trade off additional wage compensation for higher 
workers' compensation benefits. Second, inclusion 
of a workers' compensation variable raises esti- 
mates of the trade-off between wages and job 
risks. 
Thus far there has been no link between em- 
pirical issues of this type and the more policy-ori- 
ented themes in the workers' compensation litera- 
ture. A continuing perceived need that has been in 
the forefront of job safety policy since The Report 
of the National Commission on State Workniens' 
Compensation Laws (1972) has been determination 
of the adequacy of existing workers' compensation 
benefit levels.3 Nominal workers' compensation 
earnings replacement rates have traditionally been 
below 1.0 except for very low income workers 
whose wages are exceeded by a benefits floor. 
(Replacement rates taking into account the ben- 
efits' favorable tax status are higher.) Whether 
partial compensation is optimal is, however, more 
difficult to ascertain. If a job injury lowers the 
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worker's marginal utility of consumption for any 
given consumption level, as is often assumed in 
the health literature, then less than full compensa- 
tion is desirable.4 A worker would not choose to 
equalize income levels in the healthy and injured 
states if the injury impaired his ability to derive 
utility from the expenditures. How far below 1.0 
the optimal replacement rate should be and 
whether current replacement rates are optimal re- 
main open issues. 
Obtaining a general sense of whether workers' 
compensation benefits are adequate is particularly 
important since this wage benefit component is 
not the result of a voluntary market transaction. 
States set the benefit floors for different classes of 
injury so that it is not possible to infer that actual 
benefits are necessarily efficient. Firms cannot re- 
duce the benefit levels, and the transactions costs 
involved in setting up a separate program to aug- 
ment existing benefit levels may discourage efforts 
to overcome the shortcomings that arise from in- 
adequate benefits. 
The purposes of this paper are threefold. First, 
the theoretical framework we develop enables us 
to assess the economic implications of the trade-off 
between wages and workers' compensation. We 
explore this trade-off using data from the 1977 
Quality of Employment Survey coupled with in- 
formation on industry risk levels and state workers' 
compensation benefits. Second, we refine the em- 
pirical estimates of the effect of workers' com- 
pensation on wage levels and on compensating 
differentials for job risks. Our analysis differs from 
previous studies in that the workers' compensation 
variable is worker-specific rather than a state ben- 
efit average, and it incorporates the favorable tax 
status afforded benefits. In addition, the diversity 
of the risk measures and the set of other non- 
pecuniary characteristics included is broader than 
in earlier studies. In particular, we include an 
individual-specific measure of job hazards in a 
number of our estimated equations. 
As a final product of this research we generate 
the first implicit values of the nonpecuniary aspects 
of job injuries that have ever been obtained. This 
general area of concern, often referred to as the 
cost of pain and suffering and nonwork disability, 
has thus far not been amenable to estimation. 
We develop the theoretical framework for the 
subsequent analysis in section II. Section III pro- 
vides an overview of the data and the empirical 
framework, which can be viewed as a straightfor- 
ward extension of the compensating differential 
approach. In section IV we report our empirical 
results and explore their implications. 
II. Conceptual Framework 
The focus of the empirical analysis is on the 
trade-off between wages and workers' compensa- 
tion in the total compensation package for 
hazardous jobs. For much the same reason that we 
observe positive compensating wage differentials 
for job risks and other unpleasant job attributes, 
we should observe negative wage differentials for 
beneficial aspects of the overall compensation 
package, such as workers' compensation. The pur- 
pose of this section is not to reiterate this basic 
result, which is a direct generalization of the work 
of Adam Smith, but rather to investigate the prop- 
erties of the trade-off between wages and workers' 
compensation. In particular, what is the efficient 
rate of substitution between these two compensa- 
tion components? The expression we derive for 
this trade-off provides the benchmark in the sub- 
sequent empirical work for ascertaining whether 
workers' compensation levels are appropriate. 
The formulation of the model, which entails 
very few restrictive assumptions, parallels the 
health state utility function approach of Viscusi 
(1978). Suppose that there are two possible health 
states. In state 1 the worker is healthy and experi- 
ences utility U1(x) from any given consumption 
level x. In state 2 the worker experiences a job 
injury and has utility U2(x). For any given level 
of consumption, the worker would rather be 
healthy than not (U1(x) > U2(x) > 0), has a 
greater marginal utility of consumption when 
healthy than when injured (Uxl(x) > Ux2(x) > 0), 
and has a diminishing marginal utility of con- 
sumption (Uxx, U2 < 0). 
Let p denote the risk of an on-the-job injury, 
that is, the probability that state 2 prevails. Simi- 
larly, 1 - p is the probability that the worker 
remains healthy. Let w1 be the wage the worker is 
paid when he is healthy and w2 be the level of 
workers' compensation when the worker is in- 
jured. For simplicity all other income the worker 
receives when injured, such as social security ben- 4 See Viscusi (1979, 1980). 
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efits, is subsumed into the functional form of 
U2(x). 
As Worrall and Butler (1985) document, such 
supplementary benefits are a significant source of 
income support. While the level of such benefits 
affects the welfare of workers, there is no loss in 
generality in excluding them from the analysis by 
incorporating them into U2(x), provided that the 
assumptions above are satisfied. Unlike workers' 
compensation, social security benefits are not merit 
rated to any degree so that there is no trade-off 
between wages and benefits within the particular 
job contract. The benefit value does, however, 
have an indirect effect by raising the level of 
U2(x) and possibly altering its shape. The analy- 
sis below addresses the worker's welfare net of any 
such influences. Viewed somewhat differently, it 
addresses the adequacy of workers' compensation 
benefits, given the existence of these other social 
insurance programs.5 
To facilitate the conceptual analysis, assume all 
disabilities are temporary and total. Unlike earlier 
analyses of workers' compensation, this model 
and the subsequent empirical analysis explicitly 
recognize its favorable tax status. There is a pro- 
portional tax rate t on wages w1. We assume that 
the role of assets in affecting consumption is sub- 
sumed in the functional form of the utility func- 
tions, so that consumption levels in states 1 and 2 
are (1 - t)w1 and w2. 
The focus here is on the rate of substitution 
between wages and workers' compensation for a 
worker at a job with risk p. Analytically, the 
initial part of the development follows Diamond 
(1977) and Viscusi (1980). The worker's expected 
utility is given by 
(1 -p)U1((l - t)w1) + pU2(w2) = G. (1) 
The rate of trade-off between wages and workers' 
compensation that maintains the worker's level of 
welfare is 
dw, -aG/aW2 _ ___x_ 
dw2 aG/Iw1 (1-p)(1-t)Ux? 
(2) 
If the job risk p equals zero then dwl/dw2 also 
equals zero. The existence of a trade-off between 
wages and workers' compensation consequently 
hinges on the existence of some risk that state 2 
will prevail. 
In a situation in which the tax rate is zero and 
there is workers' compensation insurance available 
on an actuarially fair basis, from Viscusi (1979) we 
have the result that income will be allocated across 
the two states so that U,l equals Ux2. In this perfect 
markets case, equation (2) reduces to 
dw_ -p 
dw2 I-p 
For the workers in the sample considered below, 
and using the lost workday case injury rate as the 
value of p, this condition implies a trade-off of 
- 0.04. In effect, workers will sacrifice 4 cents of 
compensation (i.e., wages, fringes, etc.) when 
healthy for an additional 1 dollar in compensation 
when injured (i.e., workers' compensation) if there 
are no taxes and if insurance is available on an 
actuarially fair basis. 
The manner in which these relationships are 
altered under the existing compensation system 
can be ascertained by assuming that the govern- 
ment has structured the compensation system 
optimally. Observed deviations from these condi- 
tions can then be used to determine whether com- 
pensation levels are appropriate and, if not, how 
they differ from the optimal amount. 
In addition to the presence of tax rates, actual 
social insurance schemes have associated admin- 
istrative costs so that under standard loading pro- 
cedures with imperfect markets the schemes are 
not actuarially fair. Suppose that the degree of 
insurance loading is such that for each dollar of 
expected compensation in state 2 the insured 
worker must sacrifice 1 + a dollars of compensa- 
tion in state 1. Furthermore, the worker must 
break even on an actuarial basis given this degree 
of loading. The total limit on expected reimburse- 
ment, including the administrative costs of in- 
surance, is the worker's marginal product, z. For a 
competitive firm, the marginal worker's marginal 
product equals his expected wages and workers' 
compensation benefits plus an additional fee, 
apw2, to cover the administrative costs of all 
benefits received. The actuarial constraint is con- 
sequently 
(1-p)w, + (1 + a)pw2-z = 0. (3) 
S This discussion addresses a homogeneous class of injuries. 
If social security benefits vary by injury severity, the net effect 
is to raise the level of U2(x) for these more heavily com- 
pensated injuries. The empirical analysis will address whether 
there is any remaining benefits gap, where in effect the higher 
social security benefits can be viewed as making classes of 
injuries less severe. 
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The optimal insurance scheme is obtained by 
maximizing the worker's expected utility subject 
to equation (3), or 
Max V = (1 -p)U1((l - t)w1) + pU2(w2) 
WI, W2, X 
-A[(1 
-p)w, + (1 + a)pw2 - zi, 
which yields 
A(1- t) Uxl = Ux2/(l + a), 
or 
Ux2= 1t( + a) xl. (4) 
The presence of taxes and deviations from actu- 
arially fair rates lead to optimal levels of insurance 
that do not equate the marginal utility of income 
in two health states unless (1 - t)(1 + a) equals 
one. An appropriate combination of tax rates and 
insurance loading could produce this outcome. If 
(1 - t)(I + a) exceeds one, as when tax rates are 
low and the degree of insurance loading is high, 
then the optimal marginal utility of consumption 
in state 2 will be greater than in state 1. To 
produce this higher marginal utility in state 2 one 
must decrease the level of consumption in state 2. 
This result is expected since shifting resources to 
state 2 is more costly in the presence of taxes and 
actuarially unfair insurance rates, leading to a 
lower level of state 2 consumption and a higher 
associated marginal utility. Similarly, if (1 - t) 
(1 + a) is below 1, Ux' will exceed Ux2. 
The principal issue considered here is how, given 
optimal workers' compensation benefit conditions 
as characterized by equation (4), the trade-off 
between compensation in the two states is affected. 
Substituting the value of Ux2 from equation (4) 
into equation (2), we have 
dw, -p( (- t)(I + a )Ux' -p (l + a ) 
dw2 (1 -p)(1 - t)UX i -p 
(5) 
With current levels of insurance loading, ben- 
eficiaries receive approximately 80 cents of each 
dollar of insurance premiums, according to calcu- 
lations based on the net earned premium val- 
uation method in Burton and Krueger (forthcom- 
ing).7 The average value of dwl/dw2 for both the 
risk level in our sample and for the typical manu- 
facturing worker will consequently be -0.05. 
Workers should be willing to trade off 5 cents of 
wages per additional dollar of workers' compensa- 
tion benefits. 
If the level of workers' compensation benefits is 
suboptimal, as a variety of observers have sug- 
gested, then the observed rate of trade-off should 
exceed 5 cents per dollar. Similarly, if benefit 
levels are excessive, then the observed trade-off of 
wages that workers are willing to sacrifice for 
more workers' compensation will be below this 
level. In the subsequent empirical analysis we 
ascertain how estimated rates of compensation 
substitution compare with the reference point pro- 
vided by equation (5). 
It should be noted, however, that these tests for 
optimality pertain only to the private valuation by 
the worker. The analysis does not address the role 
of his neglect of the external altruistic concern of 
society in his own welfare when making his job 
choice. If, however, benefits are found to be too 
low, consideration of these altruistic interests will 
simply reinforce the result. 
A factor that works in the opposite direction is 
that of the adverse incentives or moral hazard 
problems associated with insurance. If workers' 
compensation leads workers to be less careful in 
avoiding accidents, then the efficient level of in- 
surance will be lower. As a result, observing that 
insurance is inadequate from the standpoint of 
meeting workers' financial insurance needs might 
not necessarily imply that the outcome is ineffi- 
cient if there is a significant moral hazard prob- 
lem. Other causes of an observed excess of the 
estimated rate over our optimal rate include the 
option value of risky jobs (Viscusi, 1979) and the 
value of leisure during injury-induced layoffs. 
III. Empirical Formulation and 
Sample Characteristics 
The Data Base 
The data used to estimate the model are drawn 
from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey 
(QES) in which respondents were asked about 6 This result is derived in Viscusi (1979), who also cites 
related formulations in the medical insurance literature. It 
should be noted that this result only pertains to earnings 
replacement. Medical expenditures that may enhance the 
chance of returning to good health are an entirely different 
issue. 
7 Although their paper focuses on 1983, similar calculations 
by Burton for other years suggest that the ratio of losses 
incurred to the net cost to policy holders has been in the 0.80 
range in recent years. 
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their 1976 employment experiences.8 The subsam- 
ple that we examine contains 485 observations, 
consisting of non-farm heads of households who 
were not self-employed and who worked at least 
twenty hours a week in the year of the survey. The 
1977 QES and its two antecedents (e.g., the 
1969-70 Survey of Working Conditions) are 
unique in the variety of individual-specific infor- 
mation provided about working conditions. It is 
also possible to match objective measures of 
workplace hazards to sample members based on 
their industry and to assign workers' compensa- 
tion benefit levels to workers based on their state 
of residence. Finally, unlike its earlier counter- 
parts, the 1972-73 QES and the 1969-70 Survey 
of Working Conditions, the hourly wage can be 
calculated in the 1977 QES. Thus, estimates of 
compensating wage differentials are not con- 
founded by hours effects. 
The two central variables in this study are the 
job risk and workers' compensation variables. We 
capture the health and safety risks to which the 
worker is exposed in three different ways. First, 
the survey includes subjective, individual-specific 
responses to a series of questions concerning ex- 
posure to job hazards. If a worker cited any health 
and safety risks of his job, the binary DANGER 
variable assumes a value of 1. The remaining two 
risk variables are based on the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (1979) data on industrial injuries 
and illnesses, which are matched to workers by 
three-digit industry code. These two variables are 
RISKLW and RISKTR, and they represent the 
rates of lost workday cases and total recordJed 
cases of injury and illness per 100 workers, respec- 
tively. It has long been observed that each of these 
measures is potentially affected by errors-in-vari- 
ables bias. The paper by Moore and Viscusi (1985) 
explores this problem, however, and finds no evi- 
dence of a statistically significant measurement 
error bias, or evidence of endogeneity of the risk 
variable. 
The second variable of interest is the measure of 
workers' compensation benefits. The measure we 
constructed took into account not only the favor- 
able tax status of workers' compensation benefits 
but also the manner in which the benefit formulas 
pertained to the particular individual rathel than 
to the average worker. This is especially important 
because benefit caps lead to a lower replacement 
rate for more affluent workers, while benefit floors 
can dramatically increase replacement rates for 
low wage workers. To appreciate the difference 
between replacement rates estimated for average 
workers and those used here, one need only con- 
sider the ranges of rates derived in both cases. If 
the replacement rate across states is analyzed for 
the average workers in the sample, one finds that 
it varies between about 40% and 105%, while at 
the individual level the replacement rate goes from 
18% to as high as 200%. It is also noteworthy that 
the mean replacement rate across all individuals in 
the sample increases from 0.55 to 0.83 when taxes 
are considered. 
The worker-specific replacement rates including 
recognition of tax factors differ from those in the 
literature in differing degrees. Dorsey and Walzer 
(1983) use an industry and state-specific rate based 
on insurance premiums that is then matched to 
workers using Census industry codes. Butler (1983) 
uses two measures, each at the industry level. The 
first is actual benefits paid for death, temporary 
total disability, and other injury categories that 
are included as regressors in a pooled time series- 
cross section regression of industry average wages 
on human capital, injury and death rates, actual 
benefits, and other variables. His second measure 
is the industry average replacement rate for each 
year, which corresponds more closely to expected 
benefits and is consequently better suited to the 
theoretical model. Arnould and Nichols (1983) use 
state gross replacement rates from the Com- 
pendium on Workmen 's Compensation 
(Rosenblum,1973) matched to workers in the 1970 
census 1/10,000 sample. Finally, Ruser (1985) 
uses an individual-specific measure similar to ours, 
but he does not include the effect of tax status on 
the replacement rate. 
Each of these measures yields mixed results. 
Compensating differentials are often insignificant, 
and sometimes wrong-signed. Likewise, the 
workers' compensation effects are usually weak. 
Dorsey and Walzer, in fact, find a positive rela- 
tionship between wages and workers' compensa- 
tion in the union portion of their sample. This 
finding is not replicated by Ruser. Note also that 
insurance premiums should be positively related 
to accident rates and are less likely to reflect the 
negative effect of ex ante insurance on wages. 
8 There were major changes in the workers' compensation 
benefit formulas in the 1970s so that, to the extent that there is 
a lag in the wage adjustment, the full equilibrium effects of the 
revisions may not be apparent. The results consequently may 
understate the equilibrium wage response to higher benefits. 
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Each of the previous studies attempts to iden- 
tify an additive effect of workers' compensation 
on wages, and in some instances an interactive 
effect with job risks as well. In the purely additive 
models, workers' compensation variables usually 
have the expected negative signs, and are some- 
times significant. The addition of higher-order 
terms consistently results in a dilution of this 
result. The interactive effects are usually negative, 
but are seldom significantly different from zero. 
This previous research, although suggestive, ap- 
pears to suffer from two principal shortcomings. 
First, as shown in section II above, workers' com- 
pensation affects wages only at positive risk levels, 
thus making an interactive model theoretically 
appropriate. Second, most of the aforementioned 
studies measure individual insurance levels with 
substantial error. 
The replacement rate variable to be used in the 
subsequent analysis-WORKCOMP-is similar 
to that used by Topel (1984) to measure unem- 
ployment insurance benefits. Unfortunately, there 
is no- single benefits measure that is ideal. States 
have often complex benefit formulas that provide 
for lump sum benefits and benefits depending on 
the duration of the disability. The waiting periods 
for these benefits may vary, and there are dif- 
ferences in the benefit structure according to the 
degree and type of disability, or whether a fatality 
was involved. 
The approach we adopted was to base our ben- 
efits variable on the benefit formulas for tem- 
porary total disability by state.9 This benefit cate- 
gory accounts for three-fourths of all claims and 
one-fifth of all cash benefits.10 The formulas for 
permanent total disability are almost identical, 
except that the duration of these benefits is greater. 
Similarly, the large claims category of permanent 
partial disability benefits is positively correlated 
with temporary total disability."1 Ideally, one 
might wish to obtain actuarial valuation of ex- 
pected benefit levels by state, but such calcula- 
tions are a substantial research task for which we 
did not have access to the pertinent data. Because 
of the positive correlation among benefit cate- 
gories, we will use the temporary total benefit 
formulas as a proxy for state differences in workers' 
compensation benefit levels. 
Where it was appropriate to do so, we adjusted 
the benefit levels using information on the survey 
respondents' marital status and number of depen- 
dents, and entered the resulting benefit figure as 
the numerator in the replacement ratio Ri: 
b. 
R 
w Wi (1 - ti) 
Since benefits are not taxed, the tax rate does not 
appear in the numerator of the expression for Ri. 
The denominator in Ri is the after-tax wage, 
wi(I - ti), where wi is the weekly wage and ti the 
marginal tax rate. We used the earnings, hours, 
and weeks worked information in the QES to 
calculate a wage variable. In computing the tax 
rate, we assume that all workers took the standard 
deduction, with the number of exemptions based 
on the reported number of dependents."2 
Unlike previous measures of workers' com- 
pensation replacement rates, the value of Ri is 
individual-specific and includes the effects of taxes. 
As a result, it more closely measures the actual 
rate workers use in making their decisions. As 
noted by Topel for the analogous unemployment 
compensation situation, observable determinants 
of wi and ti render Ri endogenous. To correct for 
this endogeneity, we regress Ri on a vector of 
characteristics (Zi) and state dummy variables."3 
The variable WORKCOMP, which is the pre- 
dicted value of RO, serves as the exogenous mea- 
sure of the replacement ratio. 
A detailed list of variable definitions appears in 
table 1, and table 2 summarizes the means and 
standard deviations. The dependent variable in 
the subsequent analysis is the worker's hourly 
wage (WAGE) or its natural logarithm. Each 
equation also includes a set of variables pertaining 
9 U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1976). 
10 See Price (1984). 
11 These correlations are reported in unpublished work by 
John Burton and Alan Krueger. Using a sample of 31 states, 
Burton and Krueger have found that the logarithm of tem- 
porary total disability benefits has a correlation coefficient of 
0.58 with the logarithm of permanent total disability benefits, 
0.64 with the logarithm of fatality benefits, and 0.38 with 
permanent partial benefits. Their research effort takes into 
account benefit maximums, minimums, replacement rates, and 
durations. In contrast, our measure abstracts from duration 
but is otherwise an accurate measure of both temporary total 
disability and permanent total disability. 
12 Tax rates are from Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
(1976a, b). 
13 The variables Z, include the number of dependents, a 
marital status dummy variable, and all exogenous variables in 
the wage equation. 
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TABLE 1.-VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
WA GE Computed hourly after-tax wage measure. 
FEMALE Sex dummy variable (d.v.): 1 if female, 0 otherwise. 
BLACK Race d.v.: 1 if worker is black, 0 otherwise. 
HEALTH Severity of health limitation d.v.: 1 if limiting physical or nervous condition has created either sizable or great 
problems in working on or in getting jobs, 0 otherwise. 
EXPER Experience variable: Years worked for pay since age 16. 
EDLT12 Education d.v.: 1 if worker did not finish high school, 0 otherwise. 
EDEQ12 Education d.v.: 1 if worker finished high school, 0 otherwise. 
EDSC Education d.v.: 1 if worker has some college education, 0 otherwise. 
EDCP Education d.v.: 1 if worker has at least a college degree, 0 otherwise. 
MTAX Marginal tax rate. 
DANGER Hazardous working conditions d.v.: 1 if worker answered "yes" to "does your job at any time expose you to 
what you feel are physical dangers or unhealthy conditions," 0 otherwise. 
RISKLW BLS industry hazard variable: annual rate of injuries and illnesses involving lost workdays. 
RISKTR BLS industry hazard variable: total annual rate of injuries and illnesses. 
WORKCOMP Workers' compensation replacement rate: Benefit level/(WAGE(l - MTAX)). 
FAST Work pace d.v.: 1 if job requires worker to work very fast a lot, 0 otherwise. 
NODEC Absence of worker decisions on job d.v.: 1 if it is not at all true that the worker makes a lot of decisions 
on the job, 0 otherwise. 
OVERT Overtime work d.v.: 1 if worker works overtime often, 0 otherwise. 
SECURE Job security d.v.: 1 if it is very true that the worker's job security is good: 0 otherwise. 
SIZE Firm size: Midpoints assigned to intervals for number of workers at the firm (hundreds of workers). 
SUPER Super d.v.: 1 if worker supervises anyone as part of his job, 0 otherwise. 
TRAIN Training program d.v.: 1 if employer makes available a training program to improve worker skills, 0 otherwise. 
UNION Union status d.v.: 1 if worker belongs to a union or employee's association, 0 otherwise. 
NEAST Northeast region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in northeastern United States, 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH Southern region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in southeastern U.S., 0 otherwise. 
NCENT North Central region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in north central U.S., 0 otherwise. 
WEST Western region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in western U.S., 0 otherwise. 
URBAN Urban area d.v.: 1 if worker lives in a major SMSA, 0 otherwise. 
PROF Professional and technical d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as professional or technical, 0 otherwise. 
MGR Manager and administrator d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as manager or administrator, 0 otherwise. 
SALES Sales d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as sales, 0 otherwise. 
CLERK Clerical d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as clerical, 0 otherwise. 
CRAFT Craftsmen and foremen d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as craftsman or foreman, 0 otherwise. 
OPER Operative d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as non-transport operative, 0 otherwise. 
TRANS Transport operative d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as transport equipment operative, 0 otherwise. 
UNSK Unskilled d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as unskilled laborer, 0 otherwise. 
SER VE Service d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as private household services, 0 otherwise. 
to the worker's personal characteristics, such as 
the worker's sex (FEMALE dummy variable- 
d.v.), race (BLACK d.v.), presence of health im- 
pairments (HEALTH d.v.), years of work experi- 
ence since the age of 16 (EXPER), and whether 
the worker has less than 12 years of schooling 
(EDLT12 d.v.), exactly 12 years (EDEQ1I d.v), 
some college (EDSC d.v.), or has completed at 
least a college degree (EDCP d.v.). 
Pertinent job characteristics include the worker's 
marginal tax rate (MTAX), which was used in 
constructing the WORKCOMP variable, the sub- 
jective risk assessment variable (DANGER d.v.), 
the lost workday accident rate (RISKLW), the 
total recorded injury and illness rate (RISKTR), 
the predicted value of the workers' compensation 
replacement rate ( WORKCOMP), whether the job 
requires the worker to work fast (FAST d.v.), 
whether the job permits the worker to make deci- 
sions (NODEC d.v), whether the worker works 
overtime often (OVERT d.v.), whether the worker 
has good job security (SECURE d.v.), the num- 
ber of employees at the workplace (SIZE), wheth- 
er the worker is a supervisor (SUPER d.v.), 
whether the employer offers a training program 
(TRAIN d.v.), and whether the worker is a union 
member (UNION d.v.). Occupation dummy vari- 
ables (PROF, MGR, SALES, CLERK, CRAFT, 
OPER, TRANS, UNSK, SERVE) were entered 
to control for unobservable occupation-specific 
characteristics. The particular set of nonpecuniary 
rewards variables that was selected closely fol- 
lowed the group utilized in the earnings equations 
for the earlier Survey of Working Conditions re- 
sults reported in Viscusi (1978). 
Finally, we included a set of regional dummy 
variables for whether the respondent lived in the 
Northeast (NEAST d.v.), in the South (SOUTH 
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TABLE 2.-SAMPLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
(N = 485) 
Standard 
Variable Means Deviation 
WA GE 7.676 3.779 
FEMALE 0.162 0.369 
BLA CK 0.068 0.252 
HEALTH 0.029 0.167 
EXPER 20.901 12.078 
EDLT12 0.191 0.393 
EDEQ12 0.351 0.477 
EDSC 0.226 0.419 
EDCP 0.232 0.423 
MTA X 0.264 0.095 
DANGER 0.798 0.402 
RISKLW 3.810 2.418 
RISKTR 9.738 5.627 
WORKCOMP 0.835 0.315 
FAST 0.162 0.369 
NODEC 0.016 0.127 
OVERT 0.347 0.477 
SECURE 0.427 0.495 
SIZE 6.698 10.265 
SUPER 0.351 0.478 
TRAIN 0.511 0.500 
UNION 0.341 0.474 
NEAST 0.200 0.400 
SOUTH 0.284 0.451 
NCENT 0.337 0.473 
WEST 0.179 0.384 
URBAN 0.259 0.438 
PROF 0.216 0.412 
MGR 0.136 0.343 
SALES 0.047 0.212 
CLERK 0.092 0.290 
CRAFT 0.219 0.414 
OPER 0.127 0.334 
TRANS 0.062 0.241 
UNSK 0.046 0.209 
SER VE 0.055 0.229 
d.v.), in the North Central (NCENT d.v.), in the 
West (WEST d.v.), and in an urban area (URBAN 
d.v.). Detailed industry and occupation responses 
for each worker also made it possible to create 
pertinent job-related dummy variables and to 
merge the BLS risk data with the sample informa- 
tion at the three-digit industry level."4 Overall, the 
sample was broadly representative of the working 
population. 
The wage equations differ in three ways. First, 
the functional form of the dependent variable, 
which is theoretically arbitrary, is either WAGE or 
ln WAGE. The second distinction among the re- 
gressions is in the nature of the job hazard mea- 
sure. As described above, there are three of these, 
DANGER, RISKLW, and RISKTR. Third, the 
manner in which the WORKCOMP variable en- 
ters varies, partly for purposes of comparison with 
previous research. We first omit WORKCOMP 
from the regressions, then enter it separately to 
provide a comparison with earlier research. Fi- 
nally, the theoretically preferable interaction of 
WORKCOMP with the RISK variables is in- 
cluded. Not reported below are results from re- 
gressions in which the WORKCOMP variable is 
entered both interactively and additively. The ad- 
ditive term was never significant in any of these, 
while the interactive term performed well. 
For example, the three ln WAGE equations for 
person i using RISKLWi as the hazard measure 
are15 
ln WAGEi = UkXik + yRISKLWI + E, (6) 
k 
ln WAGEi = U3kXik + yRISKL W 
k 
+ ?WORKCOMP, + Ei (7) 
and 
ln WAGE, = E/PkXik + yRISKLW, 
k 
+ 8RISKL W x WORKCOMP, 
+E e (8) 
Equation (6) corresponds to the usual hedonic 
wage regression that fails to account for insurance. 
Equation (7) is similar to those estimated by several 
other investigators. In Arnould and Nichols (1983), 
inclusion of the workers' compensation variable 
boosted the value of the risk coefficient by 12% 
and was associated with a statistically significant 
wage reduction, as expected. These modest effects 
may stem in part from their use of the death risk 
as a proxy for compensable job-related injuries, 
which is likely to be a less pertinent measure than 
the lost workday risk. Dorsey and Walzer (1983) 
adopted a similar formulation using BLS injury 
rate data and found a substantial positive effect 
on the job risk premium for nonunion workers 
and a negative effect for union workers.16 Another 
approach that has appeared in papers by Ruser 
14 In only a few cases was it necessary to use two-digit risk 
measures. 
15The variables Xk are EXPER, EXPER2, FEMALE, 
BLA CK, HEALTH, UNION, education dummy variables, 
FAST, NODEC, SECURE, SUPER, OVERT, TRAIN, SIZE, 
URBAN, and region and occupation dummy variables. 
16 In our exploratory runs to be reported in a future study on 
unions we found an effect of workers' compensation for both 
union and nonunion subsamples of the QES. 
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(1985) and Butler (1983) is to include both a 
separate workers' compensation variable and one 
that has been interacted with the risk level, but 
their results are usually not statistically significant 
or have the wrong signs. It is worth noting that all 
previous research has omitted other workplace 
characteristics, a potential source of bias. More- 
over, the individual-specific hazard variable 
DANGER has heretofore not been used in a study 
including workers' compensation. 
IV. Compensating Differential Estimates 
The focus of our empirical analysis is on a series 
of equations including different combinations of 
risk and workers' compensation variables. The 
basic structure of the wage equation is, however, 
unchanged. In table 3 we report detailed estimates 
for a representative In WAGE equation with the 
RISKLW variable and the interaction of this risk 
variable with WORKCOMP. This specification is 
the most important, since it is the lost workday 
accident rate and its interaction with the workers' 
compensation variable that best reflect the impact 
of the workers' compensation system. 
Overall, the equation and its WAGE equation 
counterpart perform in the expected manner. There 
is a positive but diminishing effect of work experi- 
ence on earnings. Workers in the college-educated 
group tend to earn more income, as do union 
members. Moreover, the performance of the ex- 
planatory variables such as union status is quite 
robust with respect to specification of the risk 
variables. 
The focus of the analysis is on the various risk 
and workers' compensation measures. Results for 
the different combinations of risk and compensa- 
tion variables utilized appear in table 4. In each 
case we first included a risk variable by itself, then 
with the interaction with the workers' compensa- 
tion variable, and finally with a workers' com- 
pensation variable not interacted with the risk. 
Although we estimated eighteen equations in all, 
the principal patterns of influence were common 
across all of these variants. In 10 of 12 cases, 
inclusion of the workers' compensation variable 
boosted the statistical significance of the risk vari- 
able alone. Inclusion of workers' compensation 
(not interacted with job risk) had little effect on 
the risk variable coefficient. This was not the case 
for the interactive regressions 2, 5, and 8. Finally, 
the workers' compensation variable was con- 
TABLE 3.-ESTIMATES OF In WAGE EQUATIONS 
(t-ratios in parentheses)a 
Independent Coefficient 
Variable (t-ratio) 
FEMALE -0.230 
(-4.545) 
BLACK -0.124 
(- 1.834) 
HEALTH -0.210 
(-2.156) 
EXPER 0.031 
(5.576) 
EXPERSQ -0.001 
(-4.773) 
EDLT12 -0.098 
(-2.028) 
EDSC -0.018 
(-0.394) 
EDCP 0.185 
(3.314) 
RISKLW 0.041 
(2.946) 
RISKL W X WORKCOMP -0.031 
(-2.079) 
FAST -0.068 
(-1.549) 
NODEC 0.140 
(1.092) 
OVERT -0.042 
(- 1.208) 
SECURE 0.085 
(2.564) 
SIZE 0.007 
(3.931) 
SUPER 0.069 
(1.761) 
TRAIN 0.049 
(1.353) 
UNION 0.160 
(4.218) 
NCENT 0.036 
(0.761) 
SOUTH -0.013 
(- 0.275) 
WEST 0.142 
(2.614) 
URBAN 0.182 
(4.599) 
PROF 0.210 
(2.132) 
MGR 0.236 
(2.375) 
SALES 0.201 
(1.780) 
CLERK 0.028 
(0.283) 
CRAFT 0.096 
(1.073) 
OPER 0.008 
(0.094) 
TRANS 0.005 
(-0.052) 
SERVE -0.290 
(-2.704) 
R2 0.477 
a Critical t-values are 1.64 (5% confidence level), and 1.96 (1% level) for 
one-tailed tests. 
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TABLE 4.-SUMMARY OF RISK AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION COEFFICIENTS (t-ratios in parentheses)a 
Independent Equation 
Number 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
WA GE Equations 
RISKLW 0.099 0.282 0.101 - - - - - - 
(1.528) (2.319) (1.599) 
RISKTR - - - 0.037 0.113 0.038 - - - 
(1.310) (2.249) (1.353) 
DANGER - - - - - - 0.270 1.057 0.252 
(0.715) (1.659) (0.660) 
RISKLW X - -0.230 - - - - - - - 
WORKCOMP (1.777) 
RISKTR X - - - -0.096 - - - - 
WORKCOMP (-1.828) 
DANGERX - - - - - - - -0.999 - 
WORKCOMP (-1.534) 
WORKCOMP - - -0.606 - - -0.610 - - -0.560 
(-1.075) (-1.083) (-0.993) 
R2 0.374 0.374 0.372 0.373 0.411 0.371 0.372 0.371 0.369 
In WAGE Equations 
RISKLW 0.017 0.041 0.017 - - - - - - 
(2.214) (2.946) (2.256) 
RISKTR - - - 0.007 0.018 0.007 
(2.017) (2.945) (2.064) 
DANGER - - - - - - 0.029 0.148 0.026 
(0.651) (2.008) (0.596) 
RISKLW X - -0.031 - - - - - - - 
WORKCOMP (-2.079) 
RISKTRX - - - - -0.012 - - - - 
WORKCOMP (-2.188) 
DANGER X - - - - - - - -0.153 - 
WORKCOMP (-2.013) 
WORKCOMP - - -0.080 - - -0.081 - - -0.074 
(-1.225) (-1.241) (-1.212) 
R2 0.479 0.477 0.474 0.478 0.477 0.473 0.474 0.472 0.469 
a Critical t-values are 1.65 (5% confidence level) and 1.96 (1% level) for one-tailed tests. 
sistently negative and statistically significant in the 
interacted version. 
The Implicit Value of Job Injuries 
Although addition of the interactive WORK- 
COMP variable greatly boosts the coefficient on 
the job risk variable, after taking into account the 
role of both the risk and the interaction term there 
is not a large difference in the implicit value of job 
injuries when evaluated at current workers' com- 
pensation levels. The implicit value of a lost work- 
day accident remains at $43,000 for the ln WAGE 
equation and rises from $32,000 to $36,000 for the 
WAGE equation upon inclusion of the interaction 
term."7 Each of these is consistent with past esti- 
mates of the implicit value of injuries, as found in 
Viscusi (1979, 1983). 
These estimates, however, do not take into 
account the depressing influence that workers' 
compensation has on the level of risk premiums. If 
workers' compensation benefits dropped to zero, 
the required wage premium would rise substan- 
tially because of the income risks workers would 
face. One measure of this increase is the increased 
implicit value of a job injury, which would rise to 
$96,000 for the wage equation and to $112,000 for 
its log wage counterpart. Similarly, full earnings 
replacement would lead to implicit values of in- 
juries of $17,000 for the wage equation and $26,000 
for the semilogarithmic form. 
Although extrapolations of this nature are not 
as reliable as are estimates pertaining to current 
levels of compensation, the overall spirit of the 
results is clear. If there were no program providing 
earnings replacement to injured workers, the level 
of risk premiums would increase greatly. The re- 17 All estimates are in 1984 dollars. 
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duction in risk premiums from additional in- 
creases in workers' compensation is much more 
modest. 
The results for the full compensation case are of 
interest in their own right since they isolate the 
earnings risk from the health status risk associated 
with job injuries. The findings here imply that at 
least half of current implicit valuations of injuries 
represent implicit values of the nonmonetary 
aspects of injuries. In effect, the $17,000 and 
$26,000 estimates presented above represent the 
value of the nonmonetary health losses associated 
with accidents. 
These results are the first estimates of non- 
pecuniary health impacts that have ever been ob- 
tained. These valuations pertain both to the value 
of pain and suffering and the more general welfare 
losses from what Burton (1983) has termed "non- 
work disability." To the extent that analysts wish 
to place a value on these nonmonetary consider- 
ations for policy evaluation or in a judicial pro- 
ceeding, these empirical estimates provide a begin- 
ning for the process of trying to assess these 
amounts, which in the past have been based en- 
tirely on speculation. At current compensation 
levels, about half of the compensation for injuries 
is for nonpecuniary consequences. If, however, 
there were no income replacement program, the 
relative importance of the health aspects would be 
far less. 
Are Benefits Levels Optimal? 
The fundamental and more immediate policy 
concern to which this paper is addressed is whether 
there is an adequate level of earnings replacement 
under the workers' compensation system. The re- 
sults most pertinent to an assessment of the rate 
of substitution between wages and workers' com- 
pensation are in column 2 of table 4, which in- 
cludes both RISKLW and the interaction of this 
variable with WORKCOMP. The lost workday 
accident rate is the risk variable that most closely 
corresponds to the probability of receiving 
workers' compensation benefits for temporary total 
disability or permanent total disability. Similarly, 
WORKCOMP is the appropriate measure of in- 
surance. 
The interaction term approach to assessing the 
role of workers' compensation is preferable be- 
cause the expected value of workers' compensa- 
tion coverage hinges on the risk level. Workers in 
completely safe jobs receive no benefits from the 
existence of such a compensation scheme. The 
expected benefits are the products of the risk level 
and benefits level, where in this case we use the 
replacement rate as the benefit variable. The inter- 
action variable appears in columns 2, 5, and 8 of 
table 4. 
The rate of substitution between wages and 
workers' compensation implied by these equations 
is quite substantial. Based on the empirical results, 
one can calculate how changes in the benefit for- 
mula affect the wage level. For both the WAGE 
and ln WAGE equations an additional 1 dollar in 
workers' compensation benefits leads to a 12 cent 
reduction in wages. In each case, the rate of 
substitution is more than twice the 5 cent per 
dollar trade-off one would expect given current 
rates of insurance loading and injury rates. More- 
over, the 4 cent per dollar trade-off that would be 
optimal with actuarially fair insurance is even 
further below the observed trade-off rates. 
Not only is there substitution between wages 
and worker's compensation, but workers are will- 
ing to sacrifice more wages when healthy than 
would be dictated by the added insurance costs. 
Taken at face value, these results imply that exist- 
ing levels of workers' compensation benefits are 
suboptimal from the standpoint of insuring in- 
come levels. Such underprovision of benefits may 
nevertheless be efficient if moral hazard is an 
important concern. Recent evidence in Butler and 
Worrall (1983) suggests that the elasticity of in- 
juries with respect to the level of benefits may be 
substantial. Their finding of a strong interstate 
correlation of workers' compensation benefits and 
reported injury rates is suggestive, but it has never 
been resolved whether this result is a reporting 
phenomenon or a reflection of an actual difference 
in injury rates. 
Several other implications of the results are also 
noteworthy. First, we have calculated the benefit 
levels necessary to provide full insurance to equate 
the marginal utility when healthy and when in- 
jured and found that an increase of $111 from the 
weekly average of $266 would achieve this result. 
Second, and finally, it is not possible to calculate 
the benefit level necessary to reach the desired 
wage trade-off of 5 cents per dollar of benefits. 
This requires information on preferences, which is 
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not available from hedonic wage equations such as 
we have estimated here. 
V. Conclusion 
The workers' compensation variable proved to 
be of fundamental importance in analyzing the 
structure of job risk compensation for workers in 
the Quality of Employment Survey. Higher levels 
of workers' compensation lead to a reduction in 
the base wage level that workers are paid. In ad- 
dition, the size of the estimated risk-wage trade- 
off is enhanced by inclusion of a workers' com- 
pensation variable, thus strengthening findings in 
the compensating differential literature. Overall, 
the strongest results were those for which the 
workers' compensation variable interacted with 
the job risk measure, as should be expected. 
Two of the implications of the results extend to 
concerns of a much broader nature. First, the 
observed rate at which workers are willing to trade 
off base wage rates for higher levels of workers' 
compensation greatly exceeds the actuarial rate of 
trade-off, even taking into account administrative 
costs. These results suggest that benefit levels in 
1976 were suboptimal, provided that one abstracts 
from moral hazard considerations. 
Finally, the results suggest that a large portion 
of compensating differentials for job hazards is for 
the nonmonetary aspects of the potential loss. 
However, if there were no workers' compensation 
system the role of income losses would pre- 
dominate. The estimate that job hazards have an 
associated health impact of $17,000 to $26,000 is 
the first estimate of the role of the nonmonetary 
costs of job risks. In this case it is clear that 
welfare implications of job risks extend well be- 
vond their financial implications. 
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